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This paper describes the trends in foreign bank ownership across the world and presents, for 
the first time, empirical evidence of the causes of multinational banks’ exits from other 
countries. Using panel data for 149 closed or divested foreign bank subsidiaries across 54 
countries from 1997 to 2009, we show that the problems encountered by subsidiaries were not 
the main cause of divestment by parent banks. Based on data for the parent banks of the 
closed subsidiaries, our results show that those parent banks reported significant financial 
weaknesses prior to closing their international operations. Therefore, we assume that a 
multinational bank’s decision to close or sell a subsidiary in another country is based mainly 
on problems in the home country, with a lesser factor being the weak performance of the 
foreign subsidiary. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last few decades, empirical and theoretical banking research has concentrated on 
foreign bank entry and cross-border mergers and acquisitions
1
. While the spotlight has been 
focused  principally  on  foreign  entry,  divestiture  has  quietly  become  an  important 
phenomenon in the banking industry. In fact, the recent financial crisis and the prominence of 
divestiture are probably the most visible signs of the massive reallocation of multinational 
banks’ assets across the countries in which they do business. 
The  divestment  of  foreign  assets  contrasts  with  the  foreign  entry  strategy  that  many 
multinational banks pursued in the last two decades. As a result of this expansion, we have 
witnessed a surge in foreign bank assets across many countries in the world. Increased foreign 
ownership  is  particularly  striking  in  emerging  markets,  especially  in  Latin  America  and 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  where  foreign  banks  account  for  50%  or  more  of  the  total 
banking  assets  in  a  number  of  countries  (Claessens  et  al.,  2008).  Hence,  the  following 
questions arise: Why do multinational banks divest their foreign operations at some point? Is 
divestment related to the situation of the foreign bank subsidiary or problems in the host 
country?  Is the divestment of foreign  assets instead a result of financial weakness of the 
parent bank, which may have been caused by a financial crisis in the home country? 
In the existing literature on multinational banking, no empirical studies exist regarding the 
factors that might lead to the closure or sale of a foreign bank subsidiary. In this paper, using 
a unique database of 149 foreign banks’ withdrawals from 54 countries in the period of 1997-
2009, we aim to fill this gap in the literature and establish the possible determinants behind a 
parent bank’s decision to close a foreign operation. 
In our opinion, there are two main hypothesis reasons for a parent bank’s decision to divest 
a foreign bank subsidiary. The first reason is the low profitability or financial distress of the 
foreign bank subsidiary in the host country. The second reason is the parent bank’s financial 
problems in its home country, which may force it to close a foreign subsidiary to improve 
profitability and/or increase its own capital. The two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. 
Hence,  we  also  assume  that  the  reason  for  closing  a  foreign  operation  may  include 
simultaneous  financial  weakness  of  the  subsidiary  and  the  parent  bank.  Therefore,  both 
hypotheses  can  be  true  under  some  circumstances;  however,  we  try  to  establish  which 
hypothesis has greater weight under the given conditions. 
                                                           
1 Bhattacharya (1993) provides a comprehensive literature survey on foreign bank entry in developing countries, 
as do Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell (2000) on international cross-border banking performance. 3 
 
Using  the  financial  statements  of  each  subsidiary  and  its  parent  bank,  we  employed  a 
random effects probit model to establish which hypothesis best explains the decision to close 
foreign subsidiaries in recent years. Our results show that the divestment decision results from 
the low profitability of both the parent bank and its foreign subsidiary. However, our analysis 
shows that greater weight should be placed on the parent bank’s financial weakness than on 
the financial weakness of the subsidiary. Based on these findings, we believe that foreign exit 
decisions may illustrate the ongoing reorganisation of parent banks’ operations to increase 
their profitability and/or capital, wherein less profitable and riskier assets are divested. 
Our results are reinforced by the fact that we find no evidence of the influence of other 
factors on the parent banks’ exit decisions. Nevertheless, we document that the likelihood of 
divestment increases during a financial crisis in both the home and host countries. In the past, 
similar  explanations  for  the  decline  of  foreign  banks’  shares  abroad  were  presented  by 
Tschoegl (2005) and Peek and Rosengren (2000). However, the work of Tschoegl (2005) was 
based mainly on case studies, and he failed to provide empirical evidence for his assumptions. 
Peek and Rosengren’s (2000) research focused mainly on the effects of the Japanese financial 
crisis in the 1990s on foreign bank lending in the US. 
Finally,  the  results  of  our  sensitivity  analysis,  in  which  we  separated  developed  and 
emerging markets, confirmed (but differed slightly from) our previous findings. Our results 
indicate that the closure of subsidiaries in developed countries may be associated mainly with 
a decline in the financial performance of the parent bank in the home country rather than with 
problems of the foreign subsidiary. However, in the case of developing countries, the weak 
performance  of  the  subsidiary  was  an  additional  factor  that  contributed  to  the  parent’s 
divestment  decision.  In  our  opinion,  our  results  confirm  the  different  attitudes  of  foreign 
banks  towards  operations  in  developed  and  developing  countries,  which  have  been 
documented previously (Claessens et al., 2009). 
We ensured that our findings were robust by subjecting them to additional tests. We used 
alternative econometric methods, changed the specifications of the dependent and exogenous 
variables,  and  altered  our  sample  data.  The  main  results  of  our  study  remain  unaffected 
throughout these robustness checks. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews  the  relevant 
literature on exit decisions of foreign banks in general and presents our main hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the sample data regarding foreign subsidiaries and parent banks. Section 4 
presents the variables and the model employed in our analysis. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the 
empirical results. Section 7 concludes the discussion. 4 
 
2.  Theoretical  predictions  regarding  the  motivation  for  foreign  bank  subsidiary 
divestment 
In the last two decades, many countries, particularly those with emerging economies, have 
witnessed an increase in the activities of foreign banks in their banking sectors. In developing 
countries, this increase in activity has largely been led by the privatisation of state-owned 
banks and the rescue of distressed domestic financial institutions. Micco, Panizza, and Yañez 
(2004)  reported  that  the  average  level  of  foreign  bank  participation  among  developing 
countries rose from 18% to 33% of total banking assets between 1995 and 2002. Today, in 
approximately 40% of all developing countries, more than 50% of banks have foreign owners. 
Strikingly,  this  figure  exceeds  80%  in  several  Central  and  Eastern  European  countries 
(Claessens et al., 2008). 
We  assume  that  multinational  banks  initially  enter  foreign  markets  to  increase  their 
profitability within an acceptable risk profile. Indeed, host and country characteristics related 
to  profitability  and  risks  have  been  found  to  be  important  drivers  of  banks’  decisions  to 
penetrate a foreign market. Focarelli and Pozzolo (2005), for example, found that banks prefer 
to  maintain  subsidiaries  in  countries  where  expected  profits  are  larger  because  of  higher 
expected economic growth and the prospect of benefiting from local banks’ inefficiencies. De 
Haas and van Lelyveld (2010) found that parent banks support subsidiaries that report high 
net interest margins or low loan loss provisioning and, therefore, grow faster than the foreign 
subsidiaries of other multinational banks. 
The entrance of foreign banks enhances the efficiency and improves the functioning of 
domestic banks. For instance, Claessens et al. (2001), using a dataset on domestic banks in 80 
countries for the period of 1988–1995, showed that the increased presence of foreign banks is 
associated with reductions in the profitability, non-interest income and overall expenses of 
domestic  banks.  Apparently,  the  competitive  pressure  of  foreign  banks  leads  to  positive 
efficiency effects in the banking sector of the host country. Moreover, these effects occur as 
soon as foreign banks enter the market and do not seem to depend on the market share of the 
foreign banks.  
The  results  of  Claessens  et  al.  (2001)  are  supported  by  a  number  of  country-specific 
empirical studies. For example, Denizer (1999) showed that in Turkey, the net interest rate 
margins, returns on assets and overhead expenses of domestic banks decreased after the entry 
of foreign banks. These changes in the banking sector occurred despite the fact that foreign 
banks possessed a market share of only 3.5-5.0% during the period of 1970–1997, which also 5 
 
confirmed  that  foreign  bank  entry  alone  increases  competitive  pressure  in  host  banking 
markets. 
While  most  studies  have  underlined  the  positive  impact  of  foreign  banks  on  increased 
banking  competition in host countries, there have also been  recent studies illustrating the 
negative effects of foreign entry. Giannetti and Ongena (2007) suggested that domestic banks 
might cut back their own lending in response to foreign entry. Likewise, Gormley (2010) 
found that firms were eight percentage points less likely to receive a loan after foreign bank 
entry because of a systematic drop in domestic bank loans. 
As the host market evolves in response to foreign entry, local market opportunities and the 
comparative advantage of the foreign bank subsidiary may decline. This decline can result in 
lowered profitability of a foreign bank subsidiary, which may motivate the parent bank to 
close or sell it. Indeed, there have been several studies documenting the weak performance of 
foreign bank subsidiaries. For example, DeYoung and Nolle (1996) found that foreign-owned 
banks  in  the  US  performed  significantly  worse  than  domestic  banks.  In  addition,  recent 
experience has shown that declining profits were one of the reasons why some foreign banks 
decided to close their operations in host countries. For example, in 2003, the Spanish Banco 
Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) sold its Brazilian operations to Bradesco after realising 
that it would be too expensive to achieve the asset size necessary to be profitable (Tschoegl, 
2005). Therefore, our first hypothesis is the following: 
Hypothesis 1: Parent banks close or sell their foreign subsidiaries due to the low profitability 
and/or financial distress of their foreign operations.  
However, parent banks may decide to divest their foreign subsidiaries due to their own 
financial problems. Williams (1996) examined the performance of Japanese banks following 
Australia's  removal  of  its  entry  restrictions  and  found  that  their  market  share  peaked 
approximately eight years after entry. However, he later observed that the market share of 
those  banks  declined  concurrently  with  the  domestic  problems  of  Japanese  banks  in  the 
1990s.  Similar  results  were  presented  by  Tschoegl  (2004)  for  the  US  banking  sector.  He 
demonstrated  that  the  assets  of  Japanese  bank  subsidiaries  peaked  in  the  early  1990s  in 
California and then began to fall. Furthermore, Peek and Rosengren (2000), who investigated 
how the financial crisis in Japan in the early 1990s affected lending by Japanese banks in the 
US, showed that the position of Japanese banks in the US banking sector declined after the 
financial crisis. 
The history of Japanese banks in the US and Australia shows that those parent banks that 
sold their subsidiaries did so as a result of problems in their home countries, not because of 6 
 
financial difficulties with their foreign operations. In addition, according to Tschoegl (2004), 
the  Japanese  banks  sold  their  foreign  operations  to  reduce  costs  and  raise  capital  as  the 
problems in their home country intensified due to the collapses of the stock market and land 
price bubble. 
The closure or sale of foreign subsidiaries can also be a result of the collapse of the parent 
bank. For example, when Banco Ambrosiano, an Italian bank, collapsed in 1982, the Italian 
authorities protected Italian depositors by transferring the bank's business to a new Italian 
entity.  However,  they  disclaimed  responsibility  for  the  obligations  of  Ambrosiano’s 
Luxembourgian  and  Latin  American  subsidiaries.  By  contrast,  when  Demirbank  failed  in 
Turkey in 2000, its subsidiaries in Bulgaria and Romania continued to function, and there was 
no run on the banks in the host markets. Instead, those subsidiaries simply became an asset 
that  the  Turkish  authorities  sold  separately  while  they  liquidated  the  failed  parent  bank 
(Tschoegl, 2005). A similar situation occurred during the recent financial crisis, when the 
healthy international assets of Lehman Brothers were sold disposed after the US-based parent 
bank went bankrupt. Thus, based on the existing empirical evidence regarding multinational 
banks’ behaviours, we propose our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Foreign bank subsidiaries are closed or sold as a result of the low profitability 
and/or financial problems of the parent bank in the home country. 
These two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. We assume that it is possible that the 
reason for divestment may be the simultaneous financial weakness of parent bank and the 
subsidiary. Consequently, we put forward our last hypothesis:  
Hypothesis  3:  Foreign  banks’  exits  are  motivated  by  the  simultaneous  low  profitability 
and/or financial distress of the subsidiary and its parent bank. 
3. Data description 
The  data  on  foreign  bank  withdrawal  were  hand-collected  using  Bureau  van  Dijk’s 
BankScope and Zypher databases and various public resources, such as annual reports and 
newspapers.  In  our  study,  we  define  a  withdrawal  from  a  host  country  as  a  parent  bank 
closing  or  selling  its  subsidiary  to  a  domestic  or  foreign  investor.  We  consider  the  term 
“foreign  bank  subsidiary”  to  mean  locally  incorporated  banks  with  over  50%  foreign 
ownership. 7 
 
Based  on  these  criteria,  we  identified  149  foreign  bank  divestments  in  39  different 
countries during the period of 1997-2009. Our sample included commercial and savings banks 
but excluded state banks and agencies of foreign banking organisations. 
In  our  sample,  most  foreign  bank  subsidiaries  were  liquidated  by  their  parent  banks 
through sales to domestic or foreign investors. In a few cases, the government took control of 
the  parent  bank  or  its  subsidiary  as  a  consequence  of  financial  distress.  In  the  empirical 
analysis, we controlled for government intervention on the subsidiary or parent bank level 
using a dummy variable called Government. The variable takes a value of 1 if the bank has 
been taken over by any kind of government entity and 0 otherwise. 
For  all  parent  banks  and  subsidiaries,  we  obtained  unconsolidated  financial  statements 
from the BankScope database for the year prior to the withdrawal, t-1. Using the financial 
statements, our sample period was 1987-2009, but the panel was unbalanced, as we do not 
have financial information for all years for each bank in our sample. Because not all banks 
report in the same currency, we converted the balance-sheet and income-statement variables 
of the parent banks and subsidiaries into US dollars. 
Table 1 lists the identified divestments of foreign bank subsidiaries in host countries. The 
table illustrates that the greatest number of subsidiary closures took place in Latin America 
and Central and Eastern Europe. This finding is not surprising, as those regions have also 
reported the greatest number of foreign bank operations in the last two decades (Cerutti et al., 
2007).  
[Table 1] 
Argentina  and  Indonesia  experienced  the  largest  number  of  foreign  bank  subsidiary 
closures. From 1997 to 2009, nine foreign bank subsidiaries were closed in Argentina, seven 
in Indonesia and five in Romania. Approximately half of the closures in Latin America and 
Asia in the sample period occurred from 2001 to 2003. The large number of closures in this 
period may have been associated with the financial crises in emerging markets that started in 
Asia in 1997, expanded in the following year into Russia and further expanded two years later 
into Brazil. Shortly thereafter, the financial crisis enveloped the Latin American continent. 
Simultaneously, in 2001, most industrialised countries went into a mild recession caused by 
the crash of the Internet bubble and the bankruptcy of Internet and technology companies 
around the world. As a consequence, the profitability of parent banks shrank – an event that 
may have prompted the divestment of subsidiaries in countries that were perceived as risky. 
Peek and Rosengren (2000) and Tschoegl (2004) showed that a financial crisis in a home 
country might result in the scaling down of foreign operations by parent banks. However, 8 
 
studies  on  the  behaviour  of  foreign  banks  during  financial  crises  in  host  countries  have 
provided mixed evidence. On one hand, Tschoegl (2005) argued that parent banks might sell 
their subsidiaries when host country markets are depressed and the risk to a parent bank of 
staying abroad is too high. Hence, foreign banks might depart quickly from any host market 
that faces political, economic or financial crises, as was the case in Asia in 1997 and Latin 
America in 1999. This departure occurs because crises often result in the erosion of the host 
country’s  economic  potential,  frequently  causing  foreign  banks  to  suffer  during  a  general 
downturn. Specifically, Crystal et al. (2001) and Dages et al. (2000) provided examples of the 
behaviours of parent banks during the Argentinian crisis. They showed that the closures of the 
French Crédit Agricole and the Canadian Scotiabank in Argentina were mainly motivated by 
the weak financial situations of their subsidiaries as a result of the crisis. In both cases, the 
parent banks were unwilling to recapitalise failed subsidiaries and decided to withdraw their 
operations, turning their subsidiaries over to the Argentinian government for rescue.  
On the other hand, some academic studies have suggested that foreign banks tend to be less 
heavily  impacted  by  crises  than  domestic  banks,  in  part  because  they  are  often  more 
conservative in their lending (Crystal et al., 2001). For example, Dages et al. (2000) showed 
that foreign banks in Argentina and Mexico exhibited stronger and less volatile loan growth 
over the period of 1994-1999 than did domestic banks. Other studies claimed that foreign 
banks could use economic crises and distortions in the banking industry to increase their 
market share in the existing market or to enter a new one. Indeed, Peek and Rosengren (2000) 
found evidence that foreign banks expanded in several Latin American countries as a result of 
liberalisations  and  worsening  conditions  in  domestic  markets.  Consistent  with  this  result, 
Guille  and  Tschoegl  (2000)  found  that  Spanish  banks  have  increased  their  ownership  in 
Argentina’s banks during the economic crisis of the last decade. Additionally, Engwall et al. 
(2001) found that foreign banks started to increase their market share in Norway during the 
Scandinavian  banking  crisis  in  the  early  1990s  while,  at  the  same  time,  reducing  their 
presence in Sweden. 
In  the  regression,  we  took  into  account  the  possible  impact  of  crisis  on  parent  banks’ 
divestment decisions by including a dummy variable. The dummies Host Crisis and Home 
Crisis took on values of 1 for years in which the host country or home country, respectively, 
experienced  a  banking  crisis.  In  addition,  when  we  tested  the  third  hypothesis,  we  used 
interaction dummies of home and host crises. The crisis dummy is based on  Laeven and 
Valencia (2008); for 2008 and 2009, we constructed it based on Internet publications of the 
World Bank and the IMF. 9 
 
Table  2  shows  the  number  of  identified  parent  banks  that  decided  to  divest  foreign 
subsidiaries from 1997 to 2009. However, we presented each parent bank only once per year 
regardless of the number of subsidiaries that were sold or closed in a given year. For example, 
in the table, the Dutch ABN Amro is shown only three times between 2000 and 2002, even 
though the number of subsidiaries closed by the bank was substantially greater than three. 
During this period, the bank’s strategy was to allocate its resources to those markets that 
generated the highest possible profits for its clients and shareholders and to exit those markets 
that failed to fit that framework. As a result, ABN Amro sold all of its foreign operations in 
Aruba,  Bahrain,  Bolivia,  Ecuador,  Kenya,  Morocco,  Lebanon,  Panama,  Sri  Lanka  and 
Suriname in the period from 2000 to 2002. In addition, its retail operations in Argentina, 
Chile,  the  Philippines  and  Venezuela,  its  onshore  banking  activities  in  the  Netherlands 
Antilles, and the retail and brokerage business in Greece were sold. However, for the purpose 
of the table, we counted ABN Amro only once per year because we were interested only in 
registering each parent bank that was divesting its foreign operations, not in the number of 
closed subsidiaries. 
We also listed the parent bank even if the closure of a subsidiary was actually implemented 
by another foreign subsidiary that was owned by the parent bank. Since 2001, the Italian 
Banca  Intesa closed several of its operations in North and South America. These  foreign 
operations were controlled by Banque Sudameris, a subsidiary of Banca Intesa located in 
France.  However,  we  counted  the  sale  of  Banque  Sudameris’  operations  abroad  as 
divestments of Banca Intesa. 
The table illustrates that over this period, the greatest number of parent banks that divested 
a foreign subsidiary were from Western European countries. From 1997 to 2009, there were 
19 disposal decisions made by Italian parent banks, 14 each by British and German parent 
banks, and 13 each by Dutch, French and US parent banks. However, these numbers do not 
reflect the scale and number of parent banks’ foreign assets divestments in each of these 
countries, as explained above. 
[Table 2] 
4. Empirical methodology 
We estimated three types of regressions to test our predictions from Section 2. In all 
regressions, the dependent variable, Di,t, is a binary variable equal to 1 if parent bank i from 
the home country j closed or sold a foreign subsidiary in the host country k in year t and 0 if 
the parent bank still operates in the country. 10 
 
In the first regression, we only used the financial characteristics of the foreign bank 
subsidiary to test the first hypothesis:  
  ,  =    +       ,    +                ,    +   , ,        (1) 
where Subi,t is a matrix of characteristics related to the divested foreign subsidiary i by the 
parent bank j, and Host Countryk is a matrix of host country control variables. 
In the second regression, we employed the financial characteristics of the parent bank 
and tested the second hypothesis:  
  ,  =    +          ,    +                ,    +   , ,      (2) 
where Parenti,t is a matrix of characteristics related to the parent bank I, and Home Countryl is 
a matrix of home country control variables. 
As these two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, in the third regression, we used 
the financial characteristics of both the parent bank and its foreign subsidiary: 
  ,  =    +       ,    +                ,    +          ,    +
+                ,    +        −               ,    +    , ,   (3) 
where Host-Home Factorsk,l,t is a matrix of variables that controls for the characteristics of 
both the home and host countries. 
Because a multinational bank typically influences the participation of a foreign bank in a 
host market, the failure to simultaneously include multinational determinants alongside host 
country factors will result in a failure to adequately explain all aspects of a foreign bank's 
profitability  (Williams,  2003).  We  were  able  to  overcome  this  shortcoming  by  using  an 
integrated model that combines both sets of factors to examine the determinants of foreign 
banks’ profits. Moreover, the results of the model may not only indicate the reason for foreign 
closures but also explain the performance of foreign bank subsidiaries. 
In all of the regressions, we employed the same bank-specific variables for the parent bank 
and its divested subsidiary. The key variable of interest, Profitability, was measured using 
return on average assets, which is calculated as net profit divided by average total assets. This 
measure does not control for the impact of any transfer pricing, but this cannot be assessed. 
We assume that bank profitability will be negatively related to the parent banks’ divestment 
decisions regarding foreign assets. 
Furthermore,  we  controlled,  among  other  bank  financial  characteristics,  for  capital 
strength, loan activity, asset quality and liquidity. These variables may also signal the bank’s 
financial problems, which may lead to the decision to exit the host market. 
In our study, capital strength was represented by the equity to assets ratio (Equity), which 
measures the amount of protection offered to the bank by its equity. Wheelock and Wilson 11 
 
(2000) suggested that a bank’s probability of disappearing is greater when its capitalisation is 
lower. They argued that this is true both in the acquisition of failing banks prior to insolvency 
and the purchase of banks by skilful managers who are able to operate successfully with high 
leverage. We therefore expect the ratio to be negatively related to the decision to close the 
foreign bank subsidiary. 
We assume that banks enter new markets with the expectation of profits. To earn these 
profits, capital must be diverted from the parent bank's domestic activities. The application of 
capital would be anticipated to result in increased assets and loan sizes, while its reduction 
would be expected to harm the foreign bank's performance. We use Loans, calculated as net 
loans divided by total assets, to control for bank activity. An increase in loan activity in a 
parent bank’s home market may result in a decrease in loan activity and profitability in the 
host markets. We may also expect that more resources will be devoted to the domestic market 
when a subsidiary reports lower profitability or when the parent bank encounters financial 
problems. As a result, we assume that loan activity will be negatively related to profitability 
and therefore also to foreign bank closure. 
Bank weakness and divestment can be attributed to poor management, as manifested in 
excessive credit and worsening loan quality. As a measure of loan quality in our study, we 
used  the  ratio  of  loan  loss  provision  to  net  interest  revenue  (Assets  Quality).  Peek  and 
Rosengren (2000) illustrated that a parent bank’s non-performing loans have an even more 
significant  impact  on  operations  in  a  host  country  than  does  a  bank’s  capitalisation.  An 
increase  in  this  ratio  represents  poor  loan  quality,  which  should  increase  the  odds  of 
divestment.  
Another important aspect that can influence the likelihood of subsidiary closure is a bank’s 
liquidity position. We assume that banks that are particularly illiquid may find it difficult to 
avoid closure because they have encountered liquidity problems that are difficult to overcome. 
In our study, we considered the ratio of liquid assets to the number of customers and amount 
of  short-term  funding  (Liquidity).  Higher  liquidity,  profitability  and  equity  values  are 
expected to indicate lower bank riskiness. 
Table 3 lists the independent variables and their mean values for the parent bank and its 
subsidiary for one year prior to the subsidiary’s closure. The mean values of the independent 
variables for the parent banks are significantly different from the values of their subsidiaries 
in two cases. First, the mean profitability shows a statistically significant difference between 
parent banks and their foreign subsidiaries. Thus, our results suggest that the closed foreign 
subsidiaries are, on average, less profitable than their parent banks. As foreign subsidiaries 12 
 
have similar proportions of loans and non-performing assets to those of the parent bank, the 
subsidiary’s lower profitability may be attributed to either lower net interest margins or higher 
overall costs. 
Second, foreign subsidiaries have statistically significantly lower levels of liquidity than 
their parent banks. Hence, the difference of means test revealed that foreign subsidiaries are, 
on average, not only less profitable but also riskier than their parent banks. Our findings 
appear to be consistent with Leveen and Praveen (1994), who compared the performance of 
foreign-owned versus domestic US banks. They also reported that foreign banks operate with 
greater risk exposures than their domestically owned counterparts. In addition, they show that 
foreign banks are significantly less profitable than domestic institutions. 
As a result, the univariate statistics may, to a certain extent, confirm the initial assumptions 
that the closure of a foreign subsidiary is caused by its low profitability rather than by the 
parent bank’s problems in the home country. On the other hand, the standard deviation of the 
profitability variable for the parent banks shows that the second and third hypotheses cannot 
be ruled out at this point. In particular, parent banks, on average, report lower levels of equity 
and higher costs of nonperforming loans than do their foreign subsidiaries, which can signal 
financial difficulties in the home market. 
[Table 3] 
In  the  regressions,  we  used  additional  explanatory  variables  to  control  for  differences 
between the home and host countries. First, we used a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the 
subsidiary is located in a less developed country (LDC) and 0 otherwise. Several studies have 
found  that  a  country’s  level  of  development  may  influence  foreign  bank  performance 
compared to domestic banks (Claessens et al., 2009). 
Second, we included a dummy to control for the geographical distance between the parent 
bank and the subsidiary. The Distance dummy takes the value of 1 if the subsidiary and the 
parent bank are from the same region and 0 otherwise. We assume that the distance between 
the host and home countries has a negative impact on performance, as it may increase the cost 
of management or reduce efficiency in other ways. Berger and DeYoung (2006), for example, 
found that distance determines the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms within bank 
holding companies. 
Finally, we included region dummies for Asia and Australia, Europe and Latin America. 
These dummy variables control for additional regional disparities that may motivate foreign 
bank exits and cause an omitted variable bias. 13 
 
We  employed  the  random  panel  probit  to  estimate  Eqs.  (1-3).  We  assumed  that  all 
unobservable factors that influence individual bank behaviours but are not captured by our 
regressors could be summarised by a random error term. Another option would have been to 
estimate  the  bank-specific  effects  as  fixed  parameters.  Because  our  panel  contains  many 
banks  relative  to  years,  this  would  imply  that  many  degrees  of  freedom  would  be  lost. 
However, we used the panel logit model with fixed effects in the robust regression. Thus, our 
results are weaker because we lose a large quantity of information, but the main coefficients 
do not change their signs. 
5. Empirical results 
In this section, we report the results for the panel probit estimation of Eqs. (1-3). For 
each regression, we present six alternative specifications, adding different proxies for bank 
and  country  characteristics.  All  regressions  were  estimated  with  robust  standard  errors, 
allowing  for  the  possibility  that  observations  for  the  same  parent  bank  may  not  be 
independent. 
The estimated coefficients themselves do not indicate a change in the probability of 
the event occurring given a one-unit change in the relevant explanatory variable. The sign of 
the estimated coefficient only indicates the direction of the change in probability. The size of 
the change in probability will differ based on the initial values of all explanatory variables and 
their coefficients. Thus, it is conventional to evaluate the explanatory variables relative to 
their mean values as a basis for inferring a change in probability. Consequently, in Tables 4-6, 
the last column presents the elasticity at means, which indicates the percentage change in the 
probability of closing a foreign bank subsidiary as a result of a one-percent change in the 
relevant explanatory variable when all variables are evaluated around their mean values. 
5.1 Main results
 
Table  4  presents  the  estimated  model  using  data  for  the  closed  foreign  bank 
subsidiaries only. The results show that low subsidiary profitability may be the main reason 
for its divestment by the parent bank, which would be in line with our first hypothesis. The 
profitability coefficient is negative and highly significant in each specification. The addition 
of control variables does not significantly change the profitability coefficient. Furthermore, 
the elasticity at means confirms that profitability is the main factor, and its value implies that 
a decrease in return on assets of 1% increases the likelihood of divestment by 1.67%. 14 
 
The coefficient of loan loss provision is positive and statistically significant, meaning 
that the subsidiary’s asset quality has improved prior to the divestment. Furthermore, the loan 
activity ratio shows a non-significant increase. As a consequence, we assume that one of the 
reasons for divestment  may be low interest margins or high overhead  costs, which could 
explain the subsidiary’s low profitability. 
The dummy variable representing government intervention is positive and significant. 
We do not, however, find evidence that a financial crisis in the host country increases the 
likelihood of closing the foreign subsidiary. The dummy crisis coefficient is positive but not 
statistically significant. Finally, almost all of the remaining coefficients have the expected 
signs, but they are not statistically significant. 
[Table 4] 
Table 5 gives the results of estimating Eq. (2). The results show that one year prior to 
subsidiary closure, the coefficient of the parent bank’s profitability is negative but statistically 
insignificant.  In the regression, only the home crisis dummy turns out to be positive and 
significant. Our results therefore show that the likelihood of divestment of a foreign operation 
increases in cases of financial crises in home markets. 
The remaining variables do not provide any further evidence of financial weakness of the 
parent bank. The declines in equity and loan activity may signal some financial distress, but 
their coefficients are insignificant. By contrast, the variables for liquidity and loan quality 
show a positive situation of the parent bank. Nevertheless, the variables are also statistically 
insignificant. As a consequence, we do not find support for the second hypothesis. 
[Table 5] 
Finally, Table 6 shows the results for the regression model (3), in which we test if the 
divestment decision was caused by the simultaneous low profitability of the subsidiary and 
the parent bank. In all of the regressions, the profitability coefficient for the parent banks and 
their subsidiaries were  negative and statistically  significant.  In all of the specifications, it 
remained negative and highly significant after the inclusion of the additional control variables. 
Our results show that divestment decisions are made in the context of simultaneous low 
profitability of the parent bank and its subsidiary. However, the coefficient of elasticity at 
means reveals that the probability of foreign asset divestment is significantly higher when the 
profitability of the parent bank declines compared to the profitability  of its subsidiary. A 
decrease  in  the  parent  bank’s  return  on  assets  by  1%  increases  the  likelihood  of  foreign 
subsidiary divestment by 3.97%, while a decline of the same magnitude in the profitability of 15 
 
a subsidiary would increase the likelihood of divestment by only 1.38%. Consequently, our 
results suggest that the parent bank’s profitability weighs more heavily in the decision to 
divest  a  foreign  subsidiary  than  does  the  subsidiary’s  profitability.  Furthermore,  we  may 
assume  that  during  financial  distress,  parent  banks  divest  those  subsidiaries  that  are 
characterised  by  low  returns.  At  the  same  time,  they  keep  their  most  profitable  foreign 
operations, which can offset future potential losses in the home market. 
In the last model, both the host country crisis and the interaction dummy of host and home 
crises are positive and statistically significant. We assume that a parent bank with financial 
difficulties in the home market may decide to divest subsidiaries located in countries that are 
perceived as risky. This divestment allows the parent bank to decrease its overall risk and 
protect  itself  from  unexpected  losses  from  abroad,  which  may  have  resulted  in  further 
declines in the bank’s profitability. Our assumptions are strengthened by the fact that the 
interaction dummy of host and home crises is positive and significant. 
[Table 6] 
In summary, we find clear support for the third hypothesis. Our results reveal that the 
likelihood  of  divestment  of  a  foreign  operation  increases  when  the  parent  bank  and  the 
subsidiary simultaneously report declining profitability. However, our results show that the 
results of the parent bank have a greater impact on the divestment decision than do the results 
of  the  subsidiary.  Therefore,  we  assume  that  parent  banks  that  need  to  improve  their 
profitability will close their nonperforming operations. 
Our empirical findings are intuitive and in line with previous studies that conclude that a 
parent  bank’s  reasons  for  closing  foreign  subsidiaries  and  withdrawing  from  international 
markets are driven by problems in the country of origin (Tschoegl, 2004). 
However, we cannot rule out the first hypothesis, as the coefficient for profitability of the 
subsidiary  was  negative  and  significant  in  all  of  our  regressions.  The  divestment  of  less 
profitable operations could also be caused by other factors, such as changes in parent bank 
strategy or management, which may also result in a short-term decline in the profitability of 
the parent bank. 
5.2 Sensitivity analysis 
In the previous section, all foreign bank subsidiaries were treated as one group. Thus, 
an underlying  assumption was that all host countries are a relatively homogeneous group 
during  our  sample  period.  However,  empirical  evidence  shows  that  foreign  bank  entry 
motives may differ between developed and developing countries. Indeed, several studies have 16 
 
documented that foreign banks are more profitable and more efficient than domestic banks in 
developing markets (Martinez Peria and Mody, 2004; Bonin et al., 2005; Berger et al., 2009) 
but are less profitable in industrialised countries (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996; Claessens et al., 
2001).  
To control for different entry and exit decisions, as well as differences in efficiency, 
we divided our sample into two subsets: developed and less developed countries. Moreover, 
within our subsample of developing countries, we excluded a large number of small banks 
from  Luxembourg  and  Switzerland.  Those  banks  could  have  biased  our  results,  as  we 
presume that they are engaged mainly in asset management and that their growth is mainly 
driven  by  the  deposit  supply  of  foreign  residents  rather  than  by  local  macroeconomic 
developments. 
Table 7 presents the regression results for these two subsamples. As expected, we 
found  slightly  different  results  for  the  two  subsets.  Our  results  show  that  the  closure  of 
operations in developing countries is mainly driven by the simultaneous low profitability of 
the parent bank and its subsidiary. Hence, the results did not differ significantly from our 
previous  findings.  All  coefficients  of  interest  have  the  expected  signs  and  remain  highly 
significant. 
However,  we  obtained  slightly  different  results  when  we  used  the  subsample  of 
developed countries. While the signs of the coefficients of subsidiaries’ profitability did not 
change, they were insignificant in models 1 and 3. In contrast to our previous results, they 
were significant for the parent bank in model 2. We assume, therefore, that decisions to divest 
in developed  countries  are mainly driven by the low profitability of the parent bank; the 
financial results of the subsidiary in the host country represent a lesser factor in divestment. 
In conclusion, using these two subsamples, we documented that exit decisions may 
differ across countries, which is in line with previous results showing that different factors 
influence foreign bank entry and efficiency in different host countries. 
[Table 7] 
6. Robustness test 
To ensure confidence in our main findings, we ran three sets of robustness checks
2
. The 
first set kept the exogenous variables and data samples the same as in the main regressions but 
used a panel model with fixed effects instead of the random model. The second set used the 
                                                           
2 These results are available from the author upon request. 17 
 
main  econometric  specifications  and  data  samples  but  altered  the  specifications  of  the 
exogenous variables. The third set used the main econometric specifications and exogenous 
variables but altered the data samples. 
We  employed  a  logit  panel  model  with  fixed  effects  as  alternative  econometric 
specifications. The results are weaker but do not change significantly, confirming the poor 
performance of both the parent bank and its foreign subsidiary as the main cause for exit from 
abroad. 
Turning  next  to  our  robustness  checks  that  used  alternative  specifications  of  our  main 
exogenous variables, we first employed an interaction variable reflecting the simultaneous 
profits  of  the  parent  and  its  subsidiary.  Second,  we  ran  the  variables  for  profitability 
separately  and  also  used  alternative  measures  to  address  the  issue  of  potential 
multicollinearity. Third, we employed other exogenous variables in the following variations: 
net loans to customers and short-term funding, liquid assets to total deposits and borrowing, 
loan loss reserves to gross loans, securities to total assets, non-interest expenditures to total 
assets, overhead expenses to total assets and net interest revenues to average assets. Finally, 
we added the bank control variables of asset size and net interest margins. Again, our results 
chiefly  suggest  that  the  main  motivations  for  divestment  are  most  likely  to  be  the  low 
profitability  of  the  subsidiary  and  problems  encountered  by  the  parent  bank  in  the  home 
country. 
We finally turned to our robustness checks that altered the data samples. First, we included 
subsidiaries from European and Latin American regions separately. The results of this data 
modification were even stronger than our main results when we included only subsidiaries 
from European countries. The coefficients were also of the same orders of magnitude as those 
in the main results for all specifications. We further restricted the data sample to the years 
1997–2002. All coefficients remained unchanged and significant in almost all instances. 
In  conclusion,  the  results  of  the  robustness  tests  confirm  the  statistically  significant 
relationship  between  the  closure  of  an  unprofitable  foreign  bank  subsidiary  and  the 
probability  of  financial  distress  of  the  parent  bank  in  its  home  country.  Alternative 
econometric  methods,  alternative  exogenous  variable  specifications,  and  alternative  data 
samples all support our core results. 
7. Conclusions 
Our results suggest a clear increase in the probability of closing a subsidiary abroad if the 
parent bank reported a decrease in profitability prior to the closure event. At the same time, 18 
 
we also found evidence of declining profitability for foreign-owned subsidiaries in the year 
prior to their divestment. However, our results show that the probability of divestment is 
higher if the parent bank and its subsidiary report decreases in profitability at the same time. 
Therefore, in our opinion, the foreign bank exit is caused primarily by problems of the parent 
bank in the home market, which is consistent with data from previous studies. Furthermore, 
based  on  our  results,  we  assume  that  the  parent  bank  probably  chooses  to  sell  its  least 
profitable operation, which may aid in mitigating risk and improving profitability. 
Our  results  are  strengthened  by  the  fact  that  we  documented  that  the  likelihood  of 
divestment increased during a financial crisis in the home country. However, our results also 
showed that a parent bank might decide to close an operation in the event of both declining 
profitability  and  a  financial  crisis  in  the  host  country.  The  results  for  the  subsample  of 
developing countries confirmed our main results, which, in our opinion, show that parent 
banks, due to declining profitability, try to reduce their risk exposure to countries that are 
perceived as risky. Indeed, we found that the closure of subsidiaries in developed countries 
was driven only by parent bank problems, while exits from emerging markets were caused by 
the declining profitability of both parent banks and their subsidiaries. 
In the context of the current financial crisis, our results show that the problems of parent 
banks in developed countries may lead to changes in the structure of the banking sector in 
developing countries. It remains unclear whether domestic banks from developing countries 
or  new  entrants  from  other  developed  economies  will  take  advantage  of  the  weakening 
position of foreign banks from developed countries. 
Finally, our results also suggest that, in the future, regulators in the host country should 
place more emphasis on controlling the parent bank and its standing in its home country. This 
regulation is important because parent banks may reallocate capital to their home country and 
disclaim  obligations  to  their  subsidiaries  abroad.  Our  study  suggests  that  a  worldwide 
supervision model is needed for multinational banks. This body would be responsible for the 
supervision of bank holding companies on a consolidation basis, as subsidiaries affect the 
parent bank’s solvency. We believe that the parent bank should not be allowed to relinquish 
all responsibility for its subsidiary. 
The late 19
th and early 20
th centuries were also characterised by increased foreign banking 
participation  in  the  domestic  banking  sectors  outside  of  Europe  and  North  America. 
According to Goldsmiths (1969), foreign banks at one time suddenly disappeared from host 
countries,  but  he  did  not  provide  additional  details  about  why  this  happened.  
Therefore, we do not know whether the same factors are behind the disinvestment decisions 19 
 
of multinational banks today; as a result, their role may decline once again in those countries 
that have a strong foreign banking presence today. We leave these issues, however, for future 
studies. 
To recapitulate, our research supports the conjecture that there is a significant correlation 
between  the  decision  to  divest  foreign  operations  and  the  financial  performance  of  a 
subsidiary and its parent bank. However, our study does not scrutinise the influence of the 
variation  of  other  subsidiaries  and  their  operations  on  the  short-  and  long-term  financial 
performance of the parent bank. Hence, this research might be biased by failing to take into 
account the complexity of interests that are involved in a diversified structure of multinational 
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Table 1 
Number of foreign bank subsidiary divestments by host country and year 
Countries  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  Total 
ALGERIA                           1  1 
ARGENTINA     1        4  1  1  1  1  1    1  11 
AUSTRALIA     1                    1    2 
AUSTRIA     1  1    1                2  5 
BELGIUM       1          1  1          3 
BOLIVIA                     1        1 
BRAZIL         2    1  4      1        8 
BULGARIA         1                    1 
CANADA                 1  1          2 
CHILE               1      1        2 
COLOMBIA               1    1          2 
CROATIA               1      1        2 
CZECH REPUBLIC            1  1  1    1    1    5 
DENMARK                 1  1          2 
EL SALVADOR                       1      1 
FRANCE             1  2  1    1  1      6 
GERMANY     1  1        1          1    4 
GUATEMALA               1        1      2 
HONDURAS               1        1      2 
HONG KONG               1  2            3 
HUNGARY     1    1  1    1      1        5 
INDONESIA         1  3  1  2              7 
IRELAND                   1          1 
ISRAEL                 1            1 
ITALY                         3    3 
JAPAN             1            1    2 
KENYA           1                  1 
KYRGYZSTAN         1                    1 
LATVIA           1                  1 
LUXEMBOURG           2  1    1      1      5 
MEXICO               1              1 
NETHERLANDS               1              1 
NEW ZEALAND               1              1 
NORWAY                         1    1 
PANAMA         1  2    1      1  1      6 
PARAGUAY                 1    1  1  1    4 
PERU                     1        1 
PHILIPPINES         1                    1 
POLAND             2  1              3 
PORTUGAL           1                  1 
ROMANIA         2  1        1          4 
SINGAPORE                           1  1 
SLOVAKIA                       1      1 
SPAIN   1  2  1        1              5 
SURINAME           1                  1 
SWITZERLAND         1  2    1  1      1    3  9 
THAILAND                 1            1 
TURKEY       1                      1 
UKRAINE                 1    1        2 
UNITED KINGDOM                   1  1        2 
URUGUAY               2      1        3 
USA           2  1  1              4 
UZBEKISTAN                     1        1 
VENEZUELA             1        1        2 
TOTAL  1  7  5  11  18  14  28  14  8  16  10  9  8  149 23 
 
Table 2 
Number of foreign bank subsidiary divestments by home country and year 
Countries  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009  Total 
AUSTRALIA           1        2          3 
AUSTRIA           1          1  1  1    4 
BAHRAIN               1  1            2 
BELGIUM           1  1    1            3 
BRAZIL           1                  1 
CANADA             1                1 
CHILE                     1        1 
COSTA RICA                       4      4 
CZECH REPUBLIC          1                1 
DENMARK           1                  1 
ECUADOR           1                  1 
ESTONIA           1                  1 
FRANCE     2  1    3  1  1  1  1  1      2  13 
GERMANY     1    1    2  3  1    2      4  14 
GREECE                   1          1 
HONG KONG         1                    1 
HUNGARY         1                    1 
ICELAND                 1        1    2 
IRELAND               1        1      2 
ITALY   1  2        2  9  3    2        19 
JAPAN       1  1  1  1  2              6 
KOREA REPUBLIC          1  1    1  1        4 
LUXEMBOURG                    1      1 
MEXICO             1                1 
NETHERLANDS      1  5    1  2  1      1  2  13 
NORWAY                   1          1 
POLAND           1      1            2 
PORTUGAL         1            1        2 
SOUTH AFRICA              1            1 
SPAIN             1  1      2    2    6 
SWITZERLAND                    1  1    2 
TURKEY      1  3  1    1      1        7 
UNITED KINGDOM  1  2        6  1  1  1  1  1    14 
USA    1    2    2  1  1    3  1  2    13 
TOTAL  1  7  5  11  18  14  28  14  8  16  10  9  8  149 
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Table 3 
Summary statistics of the parent bank and its foreign subsidiary one year prior to divestment 
 
  Foreign Bank Subsidiary  Parent Bank   
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  t-Stat. 
Profitability  -0.001  0.005  0.002  0.002  -2.331
*** 
Equity  0.118  0.009  0.067  0.008  0.800 
Loans  0.498  0.030  0.482  0.026  0.138 
Asset Quality  0.217  0.120  0.390  0.073  -1.094 
Liquidity  0.142  0.027  0.185  0.024  -1.825
** 
*, **, and *** indicate significant differences between the divested foreign bank subsidiary’s and parent bank’s 
mean values at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Foreign Bank Subsidiary Characteristics  
Probit estimations of the likelihood that a foreign bank subsidiary will be divested by its parent bank 
 







**  -0.60 
(1.781)  (1.787)  (1.823)  (1.818)  (1.822)  (1.843)   
Equity  0.532  0.587  0.646  0.521  0.500  0.451  0.07 
(0.875)  (0.882)  (0.885)  (0.892)  (0.897)  (0.919)   
Loans  0.350  0.400  0.410  0.365  0.358  0.395  0.06 
(0.332)  (0.336)  (0.338)  (0.343)  (0.344)  (0.365)   






*  -0.03 
(0.110)  (0.112)  (0.112)  (0.114)  (0.114)  (0.115)   
Liquidity  -0.579  -0.504  -0.530  -0.524  -0.495  -0.550  -0.09 










  (0.394)  (0.397)  (0.398)  (0.399)  (0.404)   
Host Crisis 
 
    0.356  0.278  0.273  0.343  0.07
a 
    (0.223)  (0.229)  (0.229)  (0.236)   
LDC        0.200  0.186  0.315*  0.05
a 
      (0.153)  (0.159)  (0.187)   
Distance 
 
        -0.053  -0.298  -0.05
a 
        (0.156)  (0.216)   
Asia & Australia 
 
          -0.070  -0.01
a 
          (0.320)   
Europe 
 
          0.214  0.03
a 
          (0.293)   
Latin America 
 
          -0.255  -0.04
a 







***   
(0.219)  (0.223)  (0.227)  (0.236)  (0.258)  (0.332)   
N  631  631  631  631  631  631   
Log likelihood  -204.07  -199.72  -198.54  -197.70  -197.64  -196.22   
Wald χ
2  11.429  20.562  22.797  24.332  24.417  26.779   
ady/dx represents the discrete change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Parent Bank Characteristics 
Probit estimations of the likelihood that a foreign bank subsidiary will be divested by its parent bank 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  dy/dx 
Profitability  -6.871  -6.723  -6.751  -7.379  -7.409  -1.67 
(4.884)  (4.878)  (4.929)  (5.008)  (5.038)   
Equity  -0.745  -0.672  -0.755  -0.957  -0.935  -0.21 
(1.021)  (1.020)  (1.029)  (1.054)  (1.077)   
Loans  -0.150  -0.129  -0.260  -0.297  -0.213  -0.05 
(0.404)  (0.403)  (0.413)  (0.415)  (0.422)   
Asset quality  -0.034  -0.030  -0.074  -0.076  -0.073  -0.01 
(0.100)  (0.100)  (0.099)  (0.101)  (0.102)   
Liquidity  0.587  0.562  0.626  0.720
*  0.617  0.14 
(0.380)  (0.379)  (0.381)  (0.391)  (0.406)   
Government    0.238  0.212  0.188  0.171  0.04
a 
  (0.285)  (0.289)  (0.288)  (0.297)   





    (0.220)  (0.222)  (0.261)   
Distance        -0.164  -0.242  -0.06
a 
      (0.140)  (0.161)   
Asia & Australia          -0.063  -0.01
a 
        (0.302)   
Europe          0.200  0.04
a 
        (0.212)   
Latin America          0.317  0.08
a 






***   
(0.252)  (0.252)  (0.255)  (0.272)  (0.307)   
N  576  576  576  576  576   
Log likelihood  -242.78  -242.15  -237.86  -237.34  -236.76   
Wald χ
2  5.404  6.054  11.340  12.525  14.163   
ady/dx represents discrete change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Subsidiary and Parent Bank Characteristics 
Probit estimations of the likelihood that a foreign bank subsidiary will be divested by its parent bank 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  dy/dx 








**  -1.38  (3.317)  (3.341)  (3.309)  (3.428)  (3.396)  (3.403)  (3.400) 
Equity  0.941  1.016  1.165  0.861  1.008  1.066  1.171  0.22  (1.060)  (1.066)  (1.069)  (1.094)  (1.084)  (1.096)  (1.116) 
Loans  0.252  0.237  0.182  0.327  0.302  0.327  0.307  0.06  (0.428)  (0.435)  (0.437)  (0.459)  (0.447)  (0.465)  (0.469) 
Asset 
quality 
-0.194  -0.211  -0.299  -0.208  -0.246  -0.251  -0.262  -0.05  (0.165)  (0.172)  (0.190)  (0.172)  (0.183)  (0.184)  (0.189) 
Liquidity  -0.610  -0.557  -0.651  -0.511  -0.592  -0.618  -0.564  -0.11  (0.438)  (0.434)  (0.445)  (0.411)  (0.428)  (0.433)  (0.439) 








**  -3.97  (8.296)  (8.507)  (8.677)  (8.970)  (9.112)  (9.112)  (9.279) 
Equity  -0.170  -0.016  0.018  0.055  0.111  -0.368  -0.678  -0.13  (1.478)  (1.513)  (1.513)  (1.539)  (1.535)  (1.583)  (1.625) 
Loans  0.006  0.125  0.161  0.090  0.074  -0.108  -0.146  -0.03  (0.572)  (0.586)  (0.587)  (0.600)  (0.593)  (0.605)  (0.609) 
Asset 
quality 
-0.115  -0.114  -0.149  -0.167  -0.204  -0.184  -0.181  -0.03 
(0.157)  (0.158)  (0.168)  (0.165)  (0.176)  (0.179)  (0.182)   
Liquidity  0.283  0.253  0.356  0.308  0.320  0.386  0.451  0.08  (0.518)  (0.533)  (0.534)  (0.545)  (0.537)  (0.535)  (0.542) 







a    (0.441)  (0.448)  (0.443)  (0.442)  (0.449)  (0.449) 
Host Crisis      0.530
*           
    (0.301)           
Home Crisis        0.147         
      (0.329)         
Host*Home 
Crisis 




a          (0.489)  (0.484)  (0.497) 
LDC            0.316  0.262  0.05
a            (0.195)  (0.202) 
Distance              -0.237  -0.05
 








**   
(0.428)  (0.440)  (0.441)  (0.453)  (0.448)  (0.461)  (0.492)   
N  344  344  344  344  344  344  344   
Log 
likelihood  -130.70  -128.15  -126.60  -125.07  -123.59  -122.41  -121.78   
Wald χ
2  12.075  17.289  19.692  18.935  21.444  23.743  24.573   
ady/dx represents discrete change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Developed and Developing Countries 
Probit estimations of the likelihood that a foreign bank subsidiary will be divested by its parent bank 
 
  Developing countries    Developed Countries   
  (1)  (2)  (3)  dy/dx  (1)  (2)  (3)  dy/dx 
  Foreign bank subsidiary characteristics 
Profitability  -3.261
*    -8.314
*  -1.81  -7.451    -9.948  -1.33  (1.959)    (4.952)  (5.905)    (7.489) 
Equity  -0.021    0.761  0.17  2.159    0.219  0.03  (1.086)    (1.600)  (1.838)    (2.577) 




**    -0.519  -0.11  -0.046    0.031  0.00  (0.167)    (0.329)  (0.164)    (0.166) 
Liquidity  -0.319    -0.685  -0.15  -1.964
**    -0.883  -0.12  (0.393)    (0.579)  (0.904)    (1.146) 
  Parent bank characteristics 
Profitability    -3.916  -18.357
*  -4.01    -33.164
**  -18.573  -2.49    (5.859)  (9.725)    (16.536)  (30.911) 
Equity    -1.761  -1.856  -0.41    2.203  0.461  0.06    (1.332)  (2.043)    (2.272)  (4.480) 
Loans    -0.934
*  -1.389
*  -0.30    1.629
**  3.059
*  0.41    (0.544)  (0.770)    (0.785)  (1.603) 
Asset 
quality 
  0.057  -0.040  -0.00    -0.751
*  -0.171  -0.02    (0.142)  (0.224)    (0.422)  (0.439) 
Liquidity    0.453  0.668  0.15    1.718
**  0.550  0.07    (0.490)  (0.617)    (0.776)  (1.553) 
Government  1.232
***  -0.044  1.002
*  0.32
a  0.834  1.167  1.179  0.31
a  (0.469)  (0.346)  (0.573)  (0.790)  (0.737)  (0.879) 
Host Crisis  0.112        8.459       
(0.250)        (6169)       
Home Crisis    -0.111        1.264
***     
  (0.344)        (0.413)     
Host*Home 
Crisis 
    0.428  0.11
a      8.033  0.94
a      (0.687)      (6920) 
Constant  -1.166
***  -0.481  -0.174    -1.653
***  -2.109
***  -2.764
***   
(0.335)  (0.330)  (0.646)    (0.341)  (0.517)  (0.980)   
N  342  302  189    289  273  155   
Log likelihood  -122.15  -130.24  -74.04    -67.51  -96.12  -38.27   
Wald χ
2  15.304  5.711  16.907    9.376  24.292  9.627   
ady/dx represents discrete change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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